

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----181127Z 120950 /14

O R 181108Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7438
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN

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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE

LONDON FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN AND EUR/CE
DIRECTOR ANDERSON

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, WB, GW, US, UK, FR
SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL: SENIOR LEVEL MEETING ON
BERLIN AND GERMANY (ASSESSMENT)

REF: (A) BONN 6579

BEGIN SUMMARY. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THE US REPS WILL
INTRODUCE FOR BONN GROUP CONSIDERATION A REVISED DRAFT
ASSESSMENT COVERING THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF EVENTS IN
BERLIN SINCE THE LAST QUADRIpartite MEETING. OUR DRAFT
ATTEMPTS AMONG OTHER THINGS TO INCLUDE OUR PRELIMINARY
THOUGHTS ON THE RECENT SOVIET DEMARCHES CONCERNING
ALLIED MILITARY PATROLS IN EAST BERLIN. THE DRAFT WILL
SERVE AS A BONN GROUP WORKING PAPER AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
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UNDERGO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE (AND SHORTENING). BECAUSE
OF ITS POSSIBLE RELEVANCE TO OTHER ONGOING DISCUSSIONS
OF THE CURRENT SITUATION, HOWEVER, WE TRANSMIT BELOW
AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE DRAFT AS IT NOW STANDS FOR
INFORMATION AND ANY COMMENTS ADDRESSEES MAY WISH TO MAKE.
END SUMMARY.

OUTLINE

I. THE INTERNAL SITUATION

II. POLITICAL PROBLEMS

A. SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN TACTICS SINCE THE QA

1. BALANCE SHEET OF THE QA
2. EFFORTS TO "IMPROVE" ON THE QA
3. STARTING OF A NEW PHASE?

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED AND FRG POLICY

1. WHY NOW?
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3. HAVE THE MEASURES RUN THEIR COURSE?

C. ALLIED MILITARY PATROLS

D. ALLIED AND FRG POLICY OPTIONS

E. BERLIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

BEGIN TEXT

I. THE INTERNAL SITUATION

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(THE FRG REP IS DRAFTING A BRIEF PASSAGE OF PERHAPS TWO OR THREE PARAGRAPHS WHICH WILL DESCRIBE ECONOMIC TRENDS OF THE PAST SIX MONTHS, EXPRESS THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE ALLIES AND THE FRG ATTACH TO ACTION AIMED AT IMPROVING THE ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE OF THE CITY, AND NOTE THAT THE VIABILITY STUDY NOW UNDER WAY WILL PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY MINISTERS AT THE DECEMBER QUADRI-PARTITE MEETING. AS REPORTED IN REFTEL, BECAUSE THIS STUDY IS NOT YET COMPLETED, THE REMAINDER OF THE DRAFT FOCUSES MORE ON POLITICAL THAN ON ECONOMIC/PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES.)

II. POLITICAL PROBLEMS

A. SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN TACTICS SINCE THE QA

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7439
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INFO USMISSION USBERLIN

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1. BALANCE SHEET OF THE QA

THE 1971 QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT HELPED USHER IN THE PERIOD OF DETENTE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND WAS ITSELF A PRODUCT OF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. IT MARKED AN END--FOR SO LONG AS DETENTE LASTS--TO THAT PHASE OF THE "BERLIN PROBLEM" WHICH, AT THE HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR, HAD MANIFESTED ITSELF IN SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO FORCE THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES TO WITHDRAW THEIR PROTECTIVE SHIELD FROM BERLIN AND TO ISOLATE THE WEST BERLINERS THROUGH FREQUENT INTERFERENCE WITH SURFACE ACCESS TO THE CITY.

THE QA DID NOT SOLVE THE BERLIN PROBLEM, BUT IT REPRESENTED A SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO POSTPONE EFFORTS TO CONVERT THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN INTO AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY. IN RETURN, THE SOVIETS OBTAINED WESTERN AGREEMENT ON CSCE AND OTHER PROGRESS TOWARD IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

FOR THE WESTERN SIDE, THE PRACTICAL IMPROVEMENTS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE QA WERE SIGNIFICANT. THE SOVIET

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GUARANTEES OF UNIMPEDED ACCESS HAVE BY AND LARGE BEEN OBSERVED, ENABLING WEST BERLINERS TO TRAVEL FREELY AND AT CONSIDERABLY LESS EXPENSE TO THE FRG. IN HUMAN TERMS, THE QA OPENED UP SIGNIFICANT POSSIBILITIES FOR FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND FOR VISITS TO RELATIVES IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN AND THE GDR. IT WAS ALSO THE QA WHICH MADE POSSIBLE THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE GDR, LEADING TO THE TREATY ON BASIC RELATIONS AND A SERIES OF FOLLOW-UP AGREEMENTS AIMED AT RESOLVING PRACTICAL PROBLEMS.

MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE QA MEANT A RESPITE IN THE CRISIS ATMOSPHERE TO WHICH THE WEST BERLINERS HAD BEEN ACCUSTOMED FOR OVER TWO DECADES.

THERE WERE ALSO PRACTICAL BENEFITS FOR THE GDR, PARTICULARLY IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. BUT NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR, ESPECIALLY, THE GDR CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN SATISFIED PERMANENTLY WITH THE BERLIN SITUATION AS IT WAS LEFT BY THE QA. THE QA MET SOME EASTERN DEMANDS--AN ELIMINATION, FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE MORE DEMONSTRATIVE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE TIES BETWEEN THE WSB AND THE FRG, SUCH AS MEETINGS OF THE FULL BUNDESTAG IN BERLIN. BUT IT LEFT BASICALLY UNTOUCHED THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WSB AND THE FRG WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE VIABILITY OF THE CITY.

IN ADDITION, WHILE THE QA PAVED THE WAY FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE GDR--A LONG-SOUGHT OBJECTIVE OF BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THE EAST GERMANS--IT LEFT THE GDR STILL FAR AWAY FROM ITS GOAL OF FULL SOVEREIGNTY. THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN ALLIED RIGHTS ON THE ACCESS ROUTES AND IN THE AIR CORRIDORS. AND WHILE THE SOVIETS INSISTED DURING THE QA NEGOTIATIONS

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THAT THERE WAS ONLY A "WEST BERLIN PROBLEM" AND THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD CONCERN ONLY THE WESTERN SECTORS, THEY SETTLED FOR AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE--"THE RELEVANT AREA"--WHICH LEFT UNAFFECTED THE WESTERN LEGAL POSITION THAT QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES APPLIED EQUALLY TO THE "CAPITAL OF THE GDR."

2. EFFORTS TO "IMPROVE" ON THE QA

IN THE YEARS SINCE THE QA THE SOVIETS AND THE GDR HAVE GRADUALLY INTENSIFIED THEIR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ON THE GAINS THEY MADE IN THE QA. PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS

HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THEIR ATTACKS ON THE FEDERAL PRESENCE
IN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN--A PROCESS WHICH IS
CONTINUING AND WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, UNDERLIES THE
DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE FRG IS ENCOUNTERING IN
EXPANDING ITS BILATERAL TREATY COOPERATION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES. EASTERN
ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE WITH THE RIGHT OF THE FRG TO
REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF THE WSB ABROAD, AND TO
CONVEY THE IMPRESSION INTERNATIONALLY THAT FRG EFFORTS
IN THAT FIELD CONSTITUTE "ILLEGAL" ATTEMPTS TO TREAT
THE WSB AS A PART OF THE FRG, OCCASIONED A SPECIAL
STUDY WHICH WAS CONSIDERED BY MINISTERS AT THEIR

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O R 181108Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7440
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
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DECEMBER 1976 MEETING.

3. STARTING OF A NEW PHASE?

EVENTS SINCE DECEMBER SUGGEST THE OPENING OF A
NEW PHASE IN THE CONTINUING SOVIET AND GDR CAMPAIGN TO
RESOLVE THE BERLIN PROBLEM IN THEIR FAVOR. BOTH BY
WORD AND BY DEED THE GDR, ALMOST CERTAINLY WITH SOVIET
CONSENT AND WITH CLEAR VERBAL SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW, HAS
SOUGHT TO PROVE THAT THE "RELEVANT AREA" OF THE QA
DOES NOT INCLUDE THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN--THAT
THE "CAPITAL OF THE GDR" IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF AND
NO DIFFERENT FROM THE REST OF THE GDR. SUCH MEASURES
AS THE CHANGE IN VISA PROCEDURES, THE EXTENSION OF

THE GDR ROAD USE TAX TO VEHICLES ENTERING THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN, THE TERMINATION OF THE "LEGAL GAZETTE FOR GREATER BERLIN"--THE JOURNAL WHICH HAD RECORDED THE TAKEOVER OF GDR LEGISLATION IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN--AND THE REMOVAL OF POLICE CHECK POINTS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE GDR WERE ALL DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE THE VIBLE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE EASTERN SECTOR AND THE GDR.

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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED AND FRG POLICY

IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE GDR WISHED TO TAKE THESE MEASURES AIMED AT PERFECTING ITS SOVEREIGNTY, OR TO IMAGINE THAT IT HAS LONG SOUGHT SOVIET PERMISSION TO DO SO. BUT TO DETERMINE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE MEASURES FOR ALLIED AND FRG POLICY, SEVERAL ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED:

-- WHY THE SOVIETS ACQUIESCED IN THE MEASURES AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME;

-- THE EXTENT TO WHICH ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY THE MEASURES TAKEN THUS FAR; AND

-- THE PROBABILITIES OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES AIMED AT DEMONSTRATING THAT "GREATER BERLIN" HAS CEASED TO EXIST.

1. WHY NOW?

THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE TIMING OF THE ACTIONS:

-- A BELIEF THAT THE INDIVIDUAL MEASURES WERE MINOR ENOUGH TO ESCAPE NOTICE. SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE TRIED TO RIDICULE ALLIED PROTESTS WITH CLAIMS THAT THE MEASURES TAKEN WERE OF NO SIGNIFICANCE (AND IN ANY CASE HAD NO EFFECT ON ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES).

-- A CONVICTION THAT THE ALLIES AND THE FRG WOULD NOT REACT. ELECTIONS AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS ON THE WESTERN SIDE MAY HAVE REDUCED THE
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LIKELIHOOD, AS ASSESSED BY MOSCOW, OF STRONG REACTIONS
TO MEASURES TAKEN DURING THE PAST FALL AND WINTER.

-- INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN THE GDR. MOSCOW MAY HAVE
AGREED THAT A BOOST TO GDR CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER
ITS OWN TERRITORY WOULD INCREASE THE RESPECT OF THE
POPULACE FOR THE REGIME AND WOULD, LIKE TIGHTER CONTROLS
ON EMIGRATION, SERVE TO DAMPEN BUDDING INTERNAL DISSENT.

-- A NEED TO COMPENSATE THE GDR FOR MEASURES
TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN BY THE SOVIETS AT EAST GERMAN
EXPENSE--E.G., IN CEMA ECONOMIC RELATIONS OR IN MULTI-
LATERAL NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS MBFR.

-- A DESIRE TO REMIND THE WEST THAT BERLIN REMAINS
VULNERABLE TO SOVIET PRESSURES--CONCEIVABLY IN
RETALIATION FOR WHAT THE SOVIETS REGARD AS AN UNACCEPT-
ABLE ACCELERATION OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN OR
AS AN UNSATISFACTORY RESPONSE TO SOVIET EFFORTS (AS
EMBODIED PARTICULARLY IN THEIR STRONG DECLARATION OF
LAST AUGUST) TO INFLUENCE ALLIED DECISIONS ON BERLIN'S
FUTURE RELATIONSHIP TO THE EC.

-- A CONVICTION THAT THE NATURAL LIMITS TO
EXPANSION OF THE FRUITS OF DETENTE HAVE ALREADY BEEN

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O R 181108Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7441
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REACHED, AND THAT THERE IS THEREFORE NO REASON TO DELAY LONGER THE SYSTEMATIC EFFORTS TO MOVE THE BERLIN PROBLEM CLOSER TO SOLUTION.

LACK OF CLEAR INFORMATION ON SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN DECISION-MAKING WOULD MAKE ANY ATTEMPT TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS IN THIS ASSESSMENT SUPERFICIAL. WESTERN DECISIONS ON HOW TO REACT WILL, HOWEVER, BE SHAPED TO SOME EXTENT BY OUR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE JUDGMENTS AS TO WHICH OF THE ABOVE FACTORS, OR COMBINATION OF FACTORS, WERE DOMINANT.

2. THE EFFECT ON ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GDR SINCE LAST FALL HAVE INDIVIDUALLY BEEN OF LIMITED IMPORTANCE AND LEGALLY DIFFICULT TO CONTEST. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO ASSERT THAT ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED. THIS IS TRUE ONLY UP TO A POINT.

BY SUPPORTING THE RIGHT CLAIMED BY THE GDR TO TAKE WHATEVER MEASURES IT WISHES WITH REGARD TO THE SECRET

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EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN, THE SOVIETS ARE ABDICATING THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES AND ARE IN EFFECT ASSERTING THAT THE QA CONFIRMED THEIR LEGAL POSITION: THAT QUADRIpartite RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES APPLY ONLY TO THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN. THE DANGERS FOR THE ALLIES FROM THIS POSITION ARE THREEFOLD:

-- IT SEEKS TO ESTABLISH THE COMPETENCE OF THE GDR TO ACT ON MATTERS HERETOFORE RESERVED FOR THE FOUR POWERS. THE LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER AREAS WHERE GDR SOVEREIGNTY IS STILL INCOMPLETE--THE ACCESS ROUTES AND THE AIR CORRIDORS--CANNOT BE IGNORED.

-- IT ENHANCES THE CLAIM OF THE SOVIETS TO A "FOURTH VOICE" IN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE WSB.

-- ULTIMATELY, IT CALLS INTO QUESTION THE BASIS FOR THE ALLIED PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN. WHILE QUADRIpartite RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES STEM FROM VICTORY IN WORLD WAR II, IT WAS THE "CORRESPONDING, RELATED QUADRIpartite AGREEMENTS, DECISIONS AND PRACTICES"--TO USE THE LANGUAGE OF THE QUADRIpartite DECLARATION--WHICH DETERMINED THE STATUS OF

GREATER BERLIN AND THE WAY IN WHICH QUADRIpartite RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WERE TO BE EXERCISED IN BERLIN. CLAIMS THAT THAT STATUS HAS NOW BEEN CHANGED ARE TANTAMOUNT TO ASSERTIONS THAT THE "AGREEMENTS, DECISIONS, AND PRACTICES" ARE NO LONGER VALID.

SUCH CONCERNS MIGHT SEEM OVERDRAWN WERE IT NOT FOR OTHER ASPECTS OF CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS CONCERNING BERLIN. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS CLAIM TO HAVE GIVEN THE GDR FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN. YET ON AT LEAST THREE OCCASIONS IN THE PAST YEAR THE SOVIETS HAVE QUESTIONED THE SUPREME AUTHORITY OF THE THREE POWERS IN THE WESTERN SECTORS

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BY ASSERTING THAT ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WERE BASED ON AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS AND WERE INSUFFICIENT TO AUTHORIZE WHAT THEY TERMED "ILLEGAL" ACTIONS BY THE FRG (SUCH AS EXTENSION OF THE EC CONSTITUTIVE TREATIES TO BERLIN AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERAL OFFICES IN BERLIN). ON MARCH 10 THE SOVIETS ALSO ASSERTED, AS THEY HAD DONE IN A NOTE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN MAY 1975, THAT THE ALLIES NEVER POSSESSED ANY ORIGINAL, NON-TREATY RIGHTS IN BERLIN.

IN SHORT, THE SOVIETS APPEAR RAPIDLY TO BE MOVING AWAY FROM THEIR UNDERTAKING IN THE QA TO RESPECT THE EXISTING SITUATION IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL VIEWS. IN ATTRIBUTING THE ORIGIN OF ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO FOUR-POWER AGREEMENTS, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY ASSERTING THAT THOSE AGREEMENTS ARE NO LONGER VALID INsofar AS THEY DETERMINED THE STATUS OF THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN, MOSCOW IS REOPENING ARGUMENTS WHICH HAD LAST BEEN THOROUGHLY AIRED SOME FIFTEEN YEARS AGO.

3. HAVE THE MEASURES RUN THEIR COURSE?

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7442
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USBERLIN

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DESPITE THE RHETORIC, THERE REMAIN CERTAIN
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN AND
THE GDR WHICH BELIE THE CLAIMS OF THE GDR TO FULL
SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS "CAPITAL":

-- VISA PROCEDURES FOR DAY VISITS TO THE EASTERN
SECTOR OF BERLIN ARE NOT IDENTICAL WITH THOSE FOR THE
GDR. THERE IS NO APPARENT NEED, HOWEVER, FOR FURTHER
CHANGES IN THIS AREA. SOME OF THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
CONCERNING FOREIGN VISITORS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UNDER
CONTROL, AND THE GDR HAS ONCE MORE ESTABLISHED ITS
COMPETENCE FOR CONTROLLING ACCESS.

-- THERE MAY ALSO BE OTHER INTERNAL GDR
MEASURES ANALAGOUS TO THE ROAD USE TAX WHICH HAVE NOT
BEEN EXTENDED TO BERLIN. IF SO, IT SHOULD COME AS NO
SURPRISE IF CORRECTIVE ACTION WERE TAKEN; THE GDR WOULD
PROBABLY ASSUME THAT ALLIED AND FRG REACTIONS WOULD
BE NO STRONGER THAN HERETOFORE. (INDEED, HONECKER
IS RELIABLY REPORTED TO HAVE BOASTED, IN AN UNPUBLISHED
COMMENT IN HIS RECENT INTERVIEW WITH THE "SAARBRUECKER
ZEITUNG," THAT HE COULD DO ANYTHING HE WANTED IN HIS
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"CAPITAL" AND THE ALLIES WOULD NOT LIFT A FINGER
AGAINST HIM.)

-- EAST BERLINERS IN THE VOLKSKAMMER WERE AGAIN
CHOSEN INDIRECTLY IN LAST OCTOBER'S ELECTIONS. THERE
ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE GDR TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO
OBTAIN SOVIET ASSENT TO ELIMINATE THIS IMPORTANT MANI-
FESTATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE STATUS OF THE CITY LAST
YEAR. THE SOVIETS WOULD PRESUMABLY RECONSIDER ONLY IF

THEY WERE ALSO PREPARED TO INTERFERE DIRECTLY WITH ALLIED RIGHTS IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN. IN ANY CASE, THE NEXT ELECTIONS ARE NOT UNTIL 1980 AND TO ANNOUNCE IN ADVANCE THAT PROCEDURES WERE TO BE CHANGED AT THAT TIME -- WHILE POSSIBLE -- WOULD BE OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE LOW-KEY WAY IN WHICH THE OTHER MEASURES HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED.

-- THE MOST IMPORTANT AND MOST OBVIOUS DISTINCTION IS THE CONTINUED EXERCISE BY ALLIED FORCES PERSONNEL OF THEIR RIGHT OF ACCESS TO AND FREE CIRCULATION IN THE EASTERN SECTOR. THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY RECOGNIZE THAT ANY INTERFERENCE WITH THIS RIGHT COULD LEAD TO A CONFRONTATION.

C. ALLIED MILITARY PATROLS

THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE REASON FOR THE SOVIETS TO DESIRE SUCH A CONFRONTATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE AT LEAST ONE ASPECT OF THE ALLIED RIGHT OF CIRCULATION IN THE EASTERN SECTOR--THE MILITARY FLAG PATROLS--ELIMINATED. EVEN MORE THAN THE ACCESS ROUTES AND THE AIR CORRIDORS, THESE PATROLS, BECAUSE OF THEIR HIGH VISIBILITY, SERVE TO UNDERCUT THE CLAIMS OF FULL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GDR REGIME IN THE EYES OF THE EAST GERMAN

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POPULACE AND THE GROWING FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IN BERLIN. THEY ARE THUS HUMILIATING BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, AND GDR PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS FOR THEIR ELIMINATION MUST BE PRESUMED TO BE STRONG AND CONSTANT.

THE RECENT SOVIET DEMARCHES CONCERNING THE PATROLS MUST THUS BE VIEWED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE AS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE ALLIES TO REDUCE AND EVENTUALLY TO ELIMINATE THE PATROLS. THESE DEMARCHES ALSO NECESSITATE A FRESH LOOK AT OTHER EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW MONTHS, EVENTS WHICH COULD BE VIEWED AS MERE PREPARATION FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVE.

D. ALLIED AND FRG POLICY OPTIONS

IT WOULD SEEM PRUDENT FOR THE AUTHORITIES OF ALL THREE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO UNDERTAKE INTERNAL REVIEWS OF PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY THEIR FLAG PATROLS, TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THEY AVOID CONDUCT WHICH COULD BE CLAIMED TO BE PROVOCATIVE.

TO GO BEYOND THAT, HOWEVER, AND
ACCEDE VOLUNTARILY TO A SOVIET DEMAND THAT THE PATROLS
THEMSELVES BE ELIMINATED WOULD ONLY INVITE FUTURE
PROBLEMS FOR OUR MAIN OBJECTIVES IN BERLIN: PRESER-

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7443
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
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VATION OF THE FREEDOM AND VIABILITY OF THE WESTERN
SECTORS. IT WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE SOVIETS AS CONFIR-
MATION OF THEIR CLAIMS THAT QUADRIpartite RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES NO LONGER APPLY TO THE EASTERN
SECTOR OF BERLIN AND THAT THE GDR IS FULLY SOVEREIGN
THERE. IT WOULD HASTEN THE DAY WHEN THEY WOULD MOVE
TO CONTROL ACCESS BY OTHER ALLIED FORCES PERSONNEL TO
THE EASTERN SECTOR. AND IT WOULD WHET THE GDR APPETITE
FOR FASTER MOVEMENT TOWARD TERMINATING THE OCCUPATION
REGIME IN THE AIR CORRIDORS AND ON THE SURFACE
ACCESS ROUTES.

THERE MAY BE SOME MERIT TO THE SOVIET CLAIM THAT
THE PATROLS ARE "RELICS OF THE PAST" AND THAT THEY
SERVE LITTLE USEFUL PURPOSE. BUT THE CLAIM THAT
THEY ARE UNLAWFUL IS CLEARLY WITHOUT MERIT, AND TO
TERMINATE THEM VOLUNTARILY WOULD BE TO SURRENDER A
LEGAL RIGHT. THIS SHOULD NOT BE DONE UNLESS THE
ALLIES AND THE FRG DETERMINE THAT IT WOULD BE
DESIRABLE TO DO SO IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A SUITABLE QUID
PRO QUO FROM THE OTHER SIDE. CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE

GIVEN TO WHETHER AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO STRIKE A
BARGAIN WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE MATTER--PERHAPS BY
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OBTAINING AN AGREEMENT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL STOP
INTERFERENCE WITH THE EXERCISE BY THE THREE POWERS OF
THEIR SUPREME AUTHORITY IN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF
BERLIN. (THIS WOULD BE A PARALLEL: WE WOULD GIVE UP
WHAT CONSTITUTES AN IMPORTANT EXERCISE OF OUR RIGHTS
IN THE EASTERN SECTOR, AND THEY WOULD DO THE SAME FOR
THE WESTERN SECTORS.) AS ONE MINOR EXAMPLE, THE
VITALITY OF BERLIN AS AN INTERNATIONAL CENTER WOULD
BE ENHANCED WERE THE SOVIETS TO ABANDON THEIR OBJECTIONS
ON INVITATIONS PROCEDURES (NOT ENOUGH OF A QUID PRO
QUO OF ITSELF, BUT ONE OF MANY IMPROVEMENTS WHICH
MIGHT BE SOUGHT).

MEANWHILE, ALLIED AND FRG EFFORTS SHOULD FOCUS ON
MEANS OF PREVENTING FORCEFUL SOVIET OR GDR ACTION TO
INTERFERE WITH ALLIED ACCESS TO THE EASTERN SECTORS.
OUR REACTION TO EVENTS THUS FAR, ASIDE FROM MAKING OUR
LEGAL POSITION CLEAR THROUGH PROTESTS AND PUBLIC
STATEMENTS, HAS BASICALLY CONSISTED OF STEPS--PRIMARILY
IN BILATERAL RELATIONS -- AIMED AT DETERRING ADDITIONAL
MEASURES. SENIOR OFFICIALS WILL WISH TO DISCUSS, IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE OVER-ALL STATE OF EAST-
WEST RELATIONS, WHETHER THERE ARE ADDITIONAL MEASURES
WHICH MIGHT PROVE EFFECTIVE AS DETERRENTS.

BEYOND THAT, THEY MAY WISH TO INITIATE CONSIDERA-
TION OF HOW WE ARE TO REACT OF DETERRENCE FAILS. SHOULD
THE SOVIETS SUCCEED IN EXCLUDING ALLIED PERSONNEL
FROM THE EASTERN SECTOR BY FORCEFUL MEANS, IT WOULD
MEAN THAT THEY HAD ESTABLISHED CONCLUSIVELY THAT
QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES APPLY ONLY TO
THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN -- THAT THE SOVIETS HAD
A FULL VOICE IN WHAT WENT ON IN THE WESTERN
SECTORS WHILE THE THREE ALLIES NO LONGER HAD ANY SAY
ABOUT THE REST OF BERLIN.

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E. BERLIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS REAFFIRMED, IN
DECEMBER 1976, THEIR DETERMINATION THAT BERLIN MUST BE

FULLY INCLUDED IN THE ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EC TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH
ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. THEY ALSO
INSTRUCTED THE BONN GROUP TO FORMULATE RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THE MANNER IN WHICH PROBLEMS IN THIS REGARD SHOULD
BE APPROACHED IN THE FUTURE. THE BONN GROUP HAS
ACCORDINGLY PREPARED A STUDY FOR CONSIDERATION BY
SENIOR OFFICIALS.
STOESSEL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, BRIEFING MATERIALS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, STATUS OF BERLIN, BERLIN QUADRIpartite MATTERS, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BONN06593
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770133-0999
Format: TEL
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770448/aaaabpox.tel
Line Count: 719
Litigation Code IDs:
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Litigation History:
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Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS, STADIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 14
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS, STADIS
Reference: 77 BONN 6579
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2780104
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NATO MINISTERIAL: SENIOR LEVEL MEETING ON BERLIN AND GERMANY (ASSESSMENT)
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, WB, GE, US, UK, FR
To: STATE LONDON
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/bacacba3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009